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Introduction
In 1807, Great Britain was the first European power to outlaw participation in the
transatlantic slave trade. Less than thirty years later, the Abolition Act of 1833 ended
slavery in Britain’s colonies. By the end of the nineteenth century, chattel slavery was
illegal in nearly every corner of the European-controlled globe. The very idea of human
bondage had grown odious to the Western conscience. The obvious question then, is what
changed?
Rather than address an enquiry of such magnitude, this thesis narrows the field of
thought by shortening the timeline and condensing the cast. I will consider the
development of antislavery sentiment in the English-speaking world through the
eighteenth century, a scope that might appear either too limited or too broad depending
on one’s perspective. The former is the case for philosophical minds who seek insight
into morality’s long-term evolution; the latter prevails if one desires a comprehensive
understanding of particular events and groups. While these criticisms are equally valid, I
believe the scope of my thesis agrees with my methodological approach. To best
understand the growth of an antislavery ethos, one must cope with political, economic,
and social factors by allowing them to exist as they did in the minds of eighteenth century
Britons: fluid, contemporaneous, interdependent, and comprising the constituent elements
of selfhood.
This thesis will argue that the rise of antislavery sentiment in England was the
cumulative outcome of a series of identity reconstructions at the individual and group
level. Men and women responded to slavery’s abhorrent nature by intuitively reshaping
their identities in a multilayered fashion. Traditional conceptions of self, family,
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community, nation, empire, world, and God’s kingdom were revaluated, torn down, and
built anew in the face of slavery’s patent injustices. These identity reformulations
unfolded at the behest and in the midst of political fragmentation, economic imperatives,
ideological movements, and social upheaval.
**

**
England’s legislative accomplishment and moral victory of 1807 was achieved

after twenty years of concerted political action. William Wilberforce and his colleagues
in the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade are remembered as the
heroes, but thousands of unnamed English citizens were equally important, simply with
their collective presence and willingness to speak out for the plight of slaves. Without
sustained political organizing and the persistence of antislavery opinion, Great Britain’s
participation in the slave trade showed no signs of abating.
Evidently, a significant portion of the English population developed a worldview
that abhorred slavery’s injustice to such an extent that neutrality and inactivity were no
longer acceptable. Over the course of the eighteenth century, a fundamental shift
occurred in the English psyche, which allowed for the emergence of an English
antislavery identity. As a means of tracking the development of this identity, I will
consider the words and actions of individuals and groups, insofar as their words and
actions reveal the process by which a common antislavery mentality grew. My
methodological approach will draw from the Annales School of history, particularly from
those historians who sought a Histoire des Mentalités. The esteemed historian Patrick H.
Hutton describes this school of thought in the following terms:

7

Decisive in this reformulation of the problem of culture is a shift of focus from
world-views, the common currency of the idealist tradition, to the structures
through which such conceptions are conveyed…By describing these forms which
shape the expression of ideas, the historian of mentalities maps the mental
universe which furnishes a culture with its essential characteristics.1
My thesis will consider the “structures” and “forms” through which “conceptions are
conveyed” and “ideas expressed,” insofar as structures and forms are the terminological
and institutional mediations by which conceptions and ideas of identity evolve through
dialectical processes and concerted organizational action. I will periodically invoke
theoretical frameworks of Annales historians – as outlined in Hutton’s extremely helpful
article, The History of Mentalities – as a means of elucidating my own thought processes
and grounding my interpretation of historical phenomena in an established
methodological style. On this note, I must also take the time to acknowledge my
indebtedness to Christopher Brown’s Moral Capital, which has not only lent me a
substantive number of quotes, but pointed me toward new realms of historical
investigation.
Before delving into the world of the eighteenth century, let us briefly
acknowledge this topic’s enduring relevance. In today’s society, slavery is more or less
universally condemned. This unanimity wields the potential of coaxing us into
categorizing history, leading toward the vacuous binary of “modern” versus “premodern,” as if an absolute moral threshold were crossed forever with slavery’s extinction.
Such a value-laden division is misleading in light of the various forms of human bondage
that still exist today, and given the often ulterior motives that contributed to the
1

Hutton, Patrick H. “The History of Mentalities: The New Map of Cultural History”. History and
Theory 20.3 (1981): 237–259. Web... 238.
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development of abolitionist sentiment. Therefore, in our attempt to understand the
ideological underpinnings of an English antislavery identity, let us not lose sight of our
own era’s moral imperatives.

9

I) Culture of Slavery
In his account of British abolitionism’s origins, Moral Capital, Christopher
Brown cautions us against linear thinking: “Antislavery thought in the eighteenth century
did not build cumulatively, block by block, to a higher stage of moral consciousness.”
Instead, the growth of antislavery opinion prior to the 1760s was one of “isolated
moralists.” These thinkers publicly condemned slavery, while “the vast majority” of their
contemporaries “acquiesced.”2 In my attempt to explain English abolitionism as a series
of identity shifts at the individual and group level, Brown’s words are particularly salient.
The de-normalization of human bondage in the English consciousness was a protracted
ordeal that ebbed and flowed in strength. The disorderly development of an English
antislavery identity consisted in a collection of social and political movements whose
motivations were often diffuse, conflicting, and removed from the good-evil dualism
frequently invoked for making sense of perceived moral progress over the course of time.
It is precisely this disorderliness that encourages us to seek clarification in the
fluid realm of identity. Even though Brown rightly exhorts us to think non-linearly, we
cannot fail to account for the unavoidably sequential operation of historical phenomena.
Therefore, as a starting point, let us consider the culture of slavery, as it existed before
the growth of antislavery sentiment forced slaveholders and slave traders into defensive
postures. This will allow us to better understand the social realities and psychological
predispositions that antislavery thinkers were fighting against, consciously and
unconsciously.
2
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From slavery’s founding in the New World, and through most of the eighteenth
century, the English public’s prevailing mindset on slavery was an anti-antislavery mode
of thought. It would be inaccurate to describe this attitude as “proslavery,” since few
people “thought to justify colonial slavery.” For most of the eighteenth century, slavery
was an institution that “rarely came under sustained attack.”3 The dearth of public
justification for slavery was tied to the equal lack of antislavery advocacy. Instead, most
subjects of the Crown – both in England and America – removed themselves from the
debate, opting to overlook the glaring ethical quandary presented by human bondage.
The economic utility of slavery was integral in maintaining public neutrality. At
the beginning of the eighteenth century, Britain’s growth as a commercial empire seemed
consequent on the continuation of unpaid slave labor, and the transatlantic trade network
that exchanged human beings for material goods. Raw sugar imports from the West
Indies fueled England’s demand for tea imports from India; textiles and weaponry
manufactured in England were popular items of barter with African slave dealers; port
towns such as Liverpool and Bristol relied on the slave trade for their economic
livelihoods. In short, slavery was an institutional cog in Britain’s increasingly
transcontinental commercial network. As a means of sustaining national wealth – and
thus national power – slavery’s unavoidability was often greeted with tacit consent.
The detachment encouraged by materialist concerns was compounded by the fact
that slavery’s visceral injustices were obscure to most English people, who, after all, had
never crossed the Atlantic. That slavery was out of sight played no small role in allowing
for a clean national conscience. Furthermore, the vague sense of savagery conjured by the
3
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idea of colonial slavery was projected onto slaveholders and slaves alike. This quasimoral, quasi-cultural projection of colonial identity was a crucial foil constructed by
English citizens that, in time, would form the template for an intra-England antislavery
identity. “The institution(s) of human bondage,” says Brown, “made the New World new.
They helped define the differences between the Americas and Europe.”4 Conversely, the
vaunted principle of liberty was perceived by the English as “peculiar to English soil and
inappropriate for less civilized people.”5 Indeed, English ideas of liberty were bound up
with notions of English republicanism, whose “institutional bulwarks against arbitrary
power... became entwined with a precocious sense of English national identity.”6
Evidently then, English perceptions of colonial slavery derived from broader
geopolitical power dynamics. We must not lose sight of Great Britain’s transatlantic
political hierarchy, whereby those who lived in the colonies – whether slaves, indentured
servants, or landowners – were subject to the will of Parliament and the Crown. This
legal subjection carried into the cultural sphere, which entailed the English public
viewing unalloyed liberty as reserved for them and them alone. The institution of slavery
simultaneously produced and verified images of colonial otherness and inferiority. These
images contrasted starkly with romanticized versions of quintessentially English
principles, which supposedly formed the moral foundation upon which harmonious (if
unequal) social relations in England has been constructed over hundreds of years. The
invisible but ubiquitous reality of colonial slavery consistently framed the development
for a distinctly English identity that withstood long-term processes of change, such as

4
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economic globalization, political division, and the social repercussions engendered
therein.

13

II) Proselytization: Abolitionism’s First Stirrings
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, almost a century before the Society of
Friends commenced its abolitionist campaign, slavery’s economic incontestability did not
translate to universal insensitivity amongst the English public. In terms of institutional
responses to slavery, the Anglican clergy stood virtually alone in their attempts to help
colonial slaves. Of course, this form of help was religiously motivated, or as Brown says,
“ameliorationist rather than abolitionist or emancipationist.”7 In other words, Anglican
missionaries did not cross the Atlantic on a noble quest to end slavery, and they held no
illusions about their vocation’s acceptable extent. Their primary aim was to instill
Christianity in slave populations. This goal not only satisfied Christ’s commands to
spread the Gospel, but also enlarged the Anglican Church’s institutional power and
ideological credibility as an influential political body within the British state.
Assuredly, many missionaries were deeply affected by the horrors of slavery.
However, as a matter of political feasibility, slaves were only offered the intangible
promise of divine redemption. To make matters worse, if Christianity were conveyed to
slaves in a certain fashion, it might render African men and women more submissive than
beforehand. “Christianity,” according to J. Harry Bennett, wielded the potential to “leave
the Negro a slave, reconcile him to his chains, and make him a more diligent and docile
servant.”8 In other words, depending on the mode and style of proselytization, the
Christianization of slave populations could foster a mentality of capitulation. Hence,

7
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wittingly or unwittingly, some Anglican missionaries effectively further entrenched the
institution of colonial slavery.
Even if their aims seem flawed in hindsight, Anglican missionaries were the only
English people in the New World working towards some form of alleviation for colonial
slaves. The religious compulsion to help slaves, in one way or another, was an important
first step in the development of a more comprehensive antislavery ethos amongst the
English public. Given Christianity’s pertinence in the growth of antislavery sentiment, it
will be useful to closely consider the United Society for the Propagation of the Gospel
(SPG), the chief institutional vehicle for English missionary work amongst slave
populations in the West Indies and American colonies.
The SPG was born on June 16th, 1701, with the issuing of a Royal Charter from
King William III. The new organization was founded with two distinct aims: provide
religious services for subjects of the Crown living abroad, and evangelize the Empire’s
non-Christian populations, which consisted of imported African slaves and deteriorating
indigenous communities. According to historian Daniel O’Connor, the SPG’s creation
fulfilled new religious and moral obligations that coincided with the British Empire’s
expanding boundaries and diversifying demography. “With people from Britain thus
widely spread and neighbor to native peoples and slaves,” says O’Connor, “the Church of
England saw itself as having new pastoral and missionary responsibilities.”9
Members of the SPG often frowned upon the institution of slavery. According to
O’Connor, there were “regular references to the slaves’ grievous and pitiable state” in the
SPG’s Anniversary Sermons, which were effectively ecclesiastical conferences with a
9
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keynote sermonizer selected by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the head of the Anglican
Church. These sermons’ typescripts were then widely distributed throughout Europe for a
larger reading audience. Moreover, these orations “regularly castigated” the “greed,
wickedness, and folly” of slave owners for their “refusal to acknowledge the slaves’
immortal souls.” For example, the 1707 speaker William Beveridge opined on his
disbelief that God could would allow for “such multitudes brought out of Africa every
Year, and made Slaves to Christians in America.” Beveridge suspected that colonial
slavery was part of God’s larger plan, in which “they [slaves] should be there [in
America] all taught the Principles of the Christian Religion” before returning to Africa as
Christian missionaries. It is noteworthy that the SPG’s widely disseminated anniversary
sermons frequently referenced the pitiable conditions of enslaved Africans. This indicates
that colonial slavery’s moral implications were within the ideological purview of
Anglican missionaries. Furthermore, it means that common religious sentiment viewed
slavery unfavorably.10
Even though members of the Anglican Church expressed indignation over the
treatment of slaves, the SPG did not advance an abolitionist agenda. It was not until the
1766 anniversary sermon that an SPG Anniversary Speaker explicitly condemned
Britain’s active participation in the slave trade. Furthermore, when the renowned
abolitionist Bielby Porteus intimated emancipationist viewpoints in his 1783 sermon, the
SPG firmly disavowed Porteus’s position.11 Ultimately, the SPG was embedded within
the Anglican Church hierarchy, which itself was integrally connected with England’s

10
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body politic and broader cultural identity. As such, the SPG’s ameliorationist ethos
reflected the public’s longstanding apathy toward slavery’s grimmer moral implications.
The rationale behind this provisional commitment to justice was exhibited in the
words of Thomas Bray, a prominent clergyman and founding member of the SPG who
understood Anglican proselytization in terms of moral indebtedness. According to Bray,
missionary activity was a form of “grateful Return for the Blessed Light of the Gospel
that has shone” in England, in addition to being England’s peculiar duty that arose from
“the Commerce and Commodities of so many Barbarous and Pagan countries” extracted
by imperial organizations.12 The idea that spreading the Gospel was a fair exchange for
slavery’s accrued material benefits is a telling statement, in its implication that religious
duties were somehow caused by moral failures in the economic realm. Indeed, the
interaction between materialist impulses and Christian obligations was a crucial dynamic
in the development of an English antislavery identity.
In the mind of Thomas Bray and other contemporary Anglican thinkers,
missionary activity was predicated on ethnic and political distinctions between unified
British citizens and disjointed tribal factions; between possessors of spiritual truth and
heretics in need of the Gospel; between Anglo-Saxons and savages. As O’Connor says,
the SPG’s mission was the embodiment of “…a political theology which saw Church and
state intimately associated, theologically and practically two aspects of a single national
community.”13 This Anglican vision of a “national community” could not treat slaves as
equal citizens before the law, since it was inextricable from deep-seated sentiments of
ethnic and cultural superiority; but neither could this vision tolerate imperial citizens
12
13
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unscrupulously reducing men and women to beasts of burden without any
acknowledgement of their humanity. With proselytization’s non-subversive approach and
‘civilizing’ function, it was an effective compromise between the British Empire’s
conflicting economic and moral exigencies.
In the growth of an English antislavery identity, Anglican proselytization offered
an ideological precedent for wider-ranging antislavery stances. It also provided a moral
impetus that, over time, transmuted into more uncompromising antislavery ideologies
that invoked various social, political and economic factors. Over the course of the
eighteenth century, though, no subset of the English public responded to colonial slavery
with greater disapprobation than the Anglican and Evangelical communities. As will be
seen throughout this thesis, the Christian component of English identity was vital in
paving the way for a broadly-based antislavery identity.

18

III) The Growth of an Antislavery Ethos
Robert Robertson was a West Indies clergyman and active pamphleteer during the
1730s. Instead of cherry-picking passages from scripture to justify slavery’s moral
rectitude (as some of his more misguided cotemporaries did), Robertson disparaged
English clergymen who “had begun to censure American slaveholders by the 1720s for
neglecting the spiritual welfare of the enslaved, for failing to instruct them in the tenets of
the national church.”14 In other words, Robertson was aware of the cultural separatism
and moral relativism that characterized England’s stance toward colonial slavery. From
Robertson’s point of view, slavery originated and was maintained by political agents and
economic powerbrokers who had never even set foot in the New World. He pointed to
King Charles II’s support in the late seventeenth century for an English slave trade, at the
expense of lower class white workers hoping to make a better life for themselves across
the Atlantic. He claimed that slavery had grown into a deep-seated institution necessary
for the colonists’ economic survival. He argued that English creditors held slaveholders
under their financial dominion. In short, Robertson argued what seems incontrovertible in
retrospect: England’s culpability in slavery’s evil existence.15
Robert Robertson’s nuanced perspective on slavery reveals some of the historical
forces and economic realities that undergirded a persisting tension in the moral calculus
of transatlantic identity politics. His position is aptly encapsulated in a quote of his that,
helpfully, conveys the ideological climate of the time in which he was writing. In a 1741
letter published by an British publication – over 120 years after Jamestown was founded

14
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and three decades’ shy of the Revolutionary War16 - Robertson presciently observed that
“The happy (unincumber’d) nation” that pursued “the Path to true Glory” by putting “an
effectual Stop to the horrid Slavery of its Fellow-Creatures, would become Arbiter of the
Affairs (not of one Quarter only, but) of the greater Part of our Habitable World.”17
This statement requires dismantling to understand how it effectively
communicates English antislavery’s stage of development at the time Robertson was
writing. First, the idea that only a “happy (unincumber’d) nation” could put an end to
slavery is emblematic of the extant political climate. Robertson’s phrasing implies that
any European empire with overseas colonies might dismantle colonial slavery, but only
when conditions were ripe, which was not the case in 1741. Transatlantic commerce was
thriving and human bondage was integral to the growing global economy. Furthermore,
peace prevailed between European powers that held colonial interests. The Seven Years’
War was still fifteen years away, and the British Empire was enjoying its increasingly
hegemonic power.
Robertson’s second important idea was that any nation that rid itself of slavery
could emerge as an “Arbiter of the Affairs” over the “greater Part of our Habitable
World.” This supposition reveals the growing importance of multinational obligations of
a moral character between political and economic entities, a natural consequence of an
interdependent global network infused by Enlightenment principles. In such a world,
Robertson prophesied, European powers would inevitably compete in more ways than
one; shared ethical schemas concerning human bondage might be consecrated into a new
16
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form of transnational moral diplomacy, but only if one nation took the first step by
abolishing slavery in its colonies and outlawing participation in the slave trade. In
Realpolitik18 terms, if Great Britain or another nation withdrew from the slave trade and
abolished the institution in its colonies, then this nation would accrue moral leverage over
its competitors, which could in turn allow for the realignment of political and economic
relationships in a manner most propitious for the nation that initially abolished slavery. In
an increasingly globalized but Eurocentric economy – wherein capital crossed oceans and
between countries, and access to information from disparate corners of the globe had
reached unprecedented levels of quickness – the reciprocity of moral obligations between
states was of novel consequence.
Of course, ideas of transnational moral commitments found their textual basis and
authoritative weight in scripture and ecclesiastical hierarchies. This leads us to
Robertson’s third crucial intimation, namely, that the path to abolitionism was de facto a
“Path to true Glory,” in which glory translated to divine justice. Indeed, as already
demonstrated, the organizational and ideological growth of English antislavery sentiment
relied heavily on Judeo-Christian principles prominent within popular discourse, and
which already informed identity construction at the individual and group level.
Longstanding religious values received a new impetus from evolving political and
economic conditions; the confluence of ancient spiritual axioms and novel transatlantic
politics would reconfigure conceptions of what it meant to be an English person and
citizen of the British Empire.

18
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While Anglican missionaries sought amelioration for slaves – and as writers like
Robert Robertson decried the hypocrisy of Englishmen who profited from the slave trade
but extricated themselves from slavery’s ethical implications – there were other elements
of British society that sought communities without the institution of slavery. An early
example is the Georgia Colony, established in 1732 with a charter issued by King George
II. The Georgia trustees, which included renowned aristocrat and social reformer, James
Oglethorpe, wanted to “help the poor in England” and “provide a place of freedom for the
persecuted Protestants in Europe.”19 The founders wanted to avoid a “society dominated
by plutocrats and slaves” in which ordinary white people were “incapable of competing
for wealth and standing.”20 They feared slavery would “promote aristocracy and debt by
mortgaging the wealth of the community to local grandees, absentee landlords, or
overseas merchants.”21 Evidently, the Georgia Colony’s initial decision to bar slavery
was fueled by an unconventional conceptions of European communities in the New
World. This vision included moral considerations, but mostly insofar as slavery’s
immorality affected the interior makeup of white, predominantly Anglo-Saxon,
communities. Even though Oglethorpe was a longstanding opponent of slavery, the
Georgia Colony’s designs reflected a more pressing desire for unalloyed white
communities, without the presence of black Africans.
Georgia’s trustees perceived the social and economic implications of an Empire
whose prestige was predicated on ruthless transatlantic commercial activity. They were

19
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troubled by the monopolistic plantations of slaveholders and feared that slavery stuck an
irreconcilable wedge between landholders and tenants; between generous aristocrats and
faithful laborers. Deep-seated ideas of paternal feudalism were rudely disrupted by the
New World’s eagerness for slavery, an institution that held no pretense about notions of
natural equality between all people. In the development of an English antislavery identity,
the desire for white communities untainted by slavery (as the Georgia Colony was
initially envisioned) constitutes an important rung within the piecemeal trajectory.
On a related note, the desire for ‘pure’ white communities in America might be
understood as a reactionary impulse. The introduction of large-scale slave plantations was
a precursor to the mechanized industry of the nineteenth century. The dehumanization
and rationalization of agrarian labor represented a cultural rupture that threatened to
extinguish the imagined social harmony of rural life in England. According to Hutton, the
wish to preserve particular societal conditions was identified by the Annales School
historian Johan Huizinga, who showed how “a conception of the world could continue to
influence the minds of men through its beauty and coherence long after the political and
social realities it was supposed to explain had disappeared.”22 As demonstrated in the
Georgia Colony, the desire for traditional socioeconomic systems with insular white
communities was part and parcel to the development of an English identity that sought to
extricate itself from the slavery’s various social, economic, and ethical implications.
Related to but distinct from the Georgia experiment was a religious movement in
the American colonies that Brown termed, “the Quaker antislavery ethic of the 1750s and

22

Hutton, “The History of Mentalities,” 238.

23

1760s.”23 During this period, Quaker communities in America “found new reasons to
examine the relationship between their principles and their practice.” Moral reformers
were concerned by a “decline of piety” and sought to “promote a renunciation of
worldliness and a new fidelity to sectarian principles.”24 Worries about slavery featured
prominently in these reformation efforts. Leaders in Quaker communities disavowed the
slavery and encouraged Quaker slaveholders to manumit their slaves. Like the Georgia
Colony, the Quaker desire to rid communities of slavery can be understood as an identity
reformulation at the material and ideological level. Brown describes how “the Quaker
turn against slavery represented an assertion of collective identity, a refinement of what it
meant to be a member of the Society of Friends” – it also represented “the triumph of an
alternative conception of social and economic life.”25 Slavery’s unjustness rendered it
incompatible with the guiding principles of civil Anglo society, and as anathema to the
Quaker spirit. Many Quakers saw slavery as a threat to traditional social relations that
comprised their collective image of a just Christian community.
However, like the founding of the Georgia colony, the Quaker antislavery
campaign “aimed at separatism rather than abolitionism,” and the primary goal was to
“cleanse the religious society of sin” whereas the “welfare of enslaved men and women
generally mattered less to them.”26 In his book, The Reformation of American Quakerism,
Jack Marietta says much the same. “The Quakers,” says Marietta, “did not stay in the
mainstream of American society and advocate abolition” – rather, “…in the Quakers’
advocacy of abolition, their criticism of American society required that they stand off
23
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from it and out of government in order to see its faults.”27 Thus, Quakers prioritized the
rectitude of their own communities, rather than the moral standards of the British Empire
as a whole.
That the primary concern of Georgia’s trustees and American Quakers was not for
the plight of slaves is an important feature in the development of an English antislavery
identity. To further elucidate this point, we must consider the “deep structures” invoked
by Annales historians, which led them to “abandon conventional narrative” due to
“teleological implications,” namely, the tendency to construct a historical narrative that
“gathers events into a coherent story” and “employs a subjective judgment about the
direction in which the historical process is tending.”28 In the context of abolitionism, a
“conventional narrative” would have us conceive of English proselytization, the Georgia
Colony, and Quaker antislavery measures as constituent elements in a linear trajectory of
moral enlightenment. Evidence, however, refutes this hypothesis: Proselytization
amounted to a consolatory gesture; Georgia’s trustees were predominantly concerned by
slavery’s tangential effects on white communities; American Quakers conceived of
slavery as sin, but only sought to eliminate this sin from their own communities.
As I mentioned in chapter one, an absence of linearity is not a deterrent in
tracking the evolution of an English antislavery identity. In fact, if perceptions and reperceptions of individual and collective identity are reflective of structural shifts in the
social, economic, and political planes of the human condition, then observing oscillations
in conceptions of English identity vis-à-vis slavery is a methodological approach parallel
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to what the Annales scholars encourage, namely, analysis of “the ‘deep structures’ of
historical reality,” as opposed to the “rapid and episodic” version of political history
traditionally posited.29 Thus far, I have concentrated on three sets of historical
phenomena – Anglican proselytization, the Georgia Colony, and Quaker antislavery
measures – as a means of outlining history’s “deep structures,” insofar at these structural
realities influenced the reformulation of English identity in the face of slavery’s
wickedness.
As the reader will recall, I also considered the viewpoint of Robert Robertson, a
historical figure whose words were embedded within – and therefore help illuminate –
the ideological landscape that delineated popular discourse in the middle of the
eighteenth century. Common conceptual terms of self-identification amongst the English
populace simultaneously mediated and demarcated the forms of identity renovation that
transpired in relation to slavery. As Hutton says, for the historian of mentalities,
“…discourse is of interest because it provides an index to meaning. In plotting how the
meanings assigned to a discourse succeed one another, the historian of mentalities is able
to trace the direction in which civilization is tending.”30 In this spirit of textual analysis,
let us now turn our attention to prominent antislavery essayists whose visions for English
and imperial society laid the ideological groundwork for an antislavery identity in the
pre-Revolutionary era.
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IV) Benezet, Sharp, and other Antislavery Visionaries
Given the transatlantic scope of British identity politics, it seems fitting that a
leading figure in the antislavery movement, Anthony Benezet, was of a multinational
upbringing. Born in France to Protestant parents, Benezet’s childhood was marked by
migration: first to the Netherlands, then London, and finally Philadelphia. Benezet, a
Quaker, made his name in the colonies and England as a vociferous antislavery activist.
His uncompromising belief in universal abolitionism distinguished him from his more
insular thinking Quaker peers.
In 1762, Benezet published a widely circulated tract: A short account of that part
of Africa inhabited by the Negroes: with respect to the fertility of the country, the good
disposition of many of the natives, and the manner by which the slave trade is carried on.
In the context of identity reformulation, this essay’s title is revealing in itself. That
Benezet’s primary focus was on the homeland of enslaved Africans signifies his
willingness and desire to contend with slavery’s repercussions beyond the British
Empire’s territorial parameters. In this essay Benezet decried the “Bloodshed continually
fomented in those unhappy People’s Country” as a result of the slave trade.31
Interestingly, Benezet’s outrage over slavery’s repercussions in African communities was
connected to religious and patriotic sentiments. “The iniquity of being so deeply engaged
in a trade,” according to Benezet, “is greatly aggravated from the Consideration that we,
as a Nation, have been peculiarly favoured with the bright Beams of the Gospel.”32
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Benezet’s idea that slavery’s injustices were aggravated because slave traders were
English and Christian is telling insofar as it reveals the inveterate biases that stunted the
development of any truly impartial antislavery identity. As a pious Quaker, Benezet was
acutely conscious of slavery’s immorality. Meanwhile, as a member of Great Britain’s
extended ethnic, cultural, and linguistic community, Benezet was troubled by slavery’s
discordance with traditional sentiments of British liberty and political justice. In his
attempts to grapple with slavery, Benezet needed to confront multiple layers of identity:
how he saw himself as a moral agent accountable to God, and how various religious,
national, and cultural components of his identity required reevaluation vis-à-vis slavery.
Benezet’s decrial of slavery’s repercussions for British and African communities
signals a form of identity reformulation grounded in a universalist orientation.33 This
broadening of mental horizons was partially inspired by Benezet’s religious background.
In his book, The Culture of English Antislavery, David Turley stresses the importance of
the “Evangelical image of humanity as one ‘great family’” which “incorporated the
imperative of proper order within local and national communities.” Atop this
transcendental belvedere, slavery “constituted a burden of individual and national guilt
and… provided a way of extending and giving reality to the notion of mankind as a
family.”34 Benezet, a pious Quaker, saw himself as an advocate of this Evangelical ethos.
In his recognition of Africa’s social deterioration, Benezet encouraged his readers to
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conceive of slavery as an institution that negatively affected all of mankind, not just the
British Empire or European world.
Benezet gave further expression to this universalist worldview in 1767, when he
published another treatise on slavery that hinted at the existence of unprecedented ethical
imperatives engendered in his epoch. According to Benzet, “the general rights and
liberties of mankind” had entered into “universal consideration” like no other era
previously.35 Thus, the origins of Benezet’s universalist logic not only stemmed from his
religious background. It also arose in response to the increasingly global scale of political
entities, economic systems, and channels of communication. For Benezet, humankind’s
newfound transcontinental scale demanded a corresponding reevaluation of power
relations, with the aim of satisfying fundamental moral benchmarks. Slavery, of course,
was an unethical relic from a long-gone era.
Benezet harnessed this universalist frame of mind as a means of reconfiguring his
perception of “society” and its constituent elements. “This practice [slavery],” according
to Benezet, was “destructive of the welfare of human society.”36 Traditionally, ideas of
society were perceived in terms of national identity and particular cultural phenomena
generated therein. For instance, English society in the eighteenth century contrasted
sharply with notions of French society, or Russian society. However, Benezet discounted
these distinctions and stressed the need to recognize “human society” when thinking
critically about slavery. Benezet underscored this point by quoting an unnamed
contemporary, who wrote in 1757: ‘The Negroes in our Colonies endure a slavery more
35
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compleat and attended with far worse circumstances than what any people in their
condition suffer in any other part of the world, or have suffered in any other period of
time.”37 Hence, Benezet was not alone in his universalist orientation. The anonymous
author, like Benezet, conceived of slavery’s immorality through a lens unbounded by
geographical and temporal constraints. In terms of identity reformulation, a widened
mental horizon shows a growing sensibility for fundamental moral certainties at the
expense of traditional group allegiances.
When Benezet published this second essay in 1767, a young Englishman was just
starting to get involved in the burgeoning antislavery movement. Born in 1735, over
twenty-two years after Benezet, Granville Sharp was a young civil servant and son to a
distinguished clergyman. In 1765, while visiting his brother in London, Sharp
encountered a badly beaten slave named Jonathan Strong who had been cast into the
streets by a callous master. Granville and his brother paid for Strong’s treatment and
restoration, but two years later in 1767, Strong’s old master tracked him down, kidnapped
him, and arranged to sell him to a planter in the West Indies. Sharp received word of
these developments and managed to procure a court hearing that won Strong his freedom.
This chain of events set Sharp on his way to becoming one of England’s most vocal
antislavery activists.
Over the next two years, Sharp continued working to prevent the extradition of
freed black people living in England. In 1769, Sharp acquired further notoriety with a
contentious essay on slavery’s unlawfulness in England. In this tract, Sharp drew sharp
contrasts – in terms of cultural criteria and legal institutions – between England and her
37
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colonies. His uncompromising vehemence was accompanied by a conceptual framework
for an English identity removed from, and pitted against, the institution of colonial
slavery. Sharp castigated his compatriots who “still endeavor to inculcate and maintain,
even in this island, the ungenerous West Indian Notions” concerning property in slaves.38
It is of consequence that Sharp distinguished “West Indian Notions” from, presumably,
“notions” of an English variety. This conceptual distinction imputed moral responsibility
onto colonial slaveholders. He then lamented the “Ruffians” who kidnapped free black
people living in England to sell them abroad, accusing them of acting in, “open Contempt
of the English Laws, and of the Habeas Corpus act in particular… Negroes, and all other
Aliens are the King’s Subjects entitled to the Protection of the English Laws.”39 Sharp’s
appeal to English law allowed him to posit a historicized vision of English identity in
which time-honored legal institutions elevated the moral stature and political maturity of
English people over American colonists.
Sharp stressed this divergence by highlighting disparate conceptions of private
property. According to Sharp, Englishmen who attempted to sell free black people to
slaveholders in the colonies, “cannot possibly ground their Defence on any other Point
whatsoever, than this single Plea of private Property.”40 Given that slavery’s justificatory
basis revolved around colonial ideas of private property, Sharp was insinuating the
divergence of value systems between England and her colonies. In slavery’s monetization
and commodification of human beings, Sharp perceived an institution grossly anathema
38
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to common perceptions of England’s political tradition, which placed a high value on
liberty, and which valued fair arbitration on matters of private property. Indeed, this latter
point was clearly expressed in the 1760s by the esteemed jurist and legal scholar, William
Blackstone, who noted that in England, “the metes and boundaries of private property”
were kept in check via the “…twofold barrier, of a presentment and a trial by jury” which
fairly balanced “the liberties of the people, and the prerogative of the crown.”41 Or, as
Sharp bluntly put it: “The law of England is a Law of Mercy.”42
Sharp’s commentary on private property also borrowed from religious principles
and Enlightenment ideals. “It must appear,” said Sharp, “that the law doth no wrong,
when it rejects the lesser claim of estimable property, in favour of that natural interest
which is inestimable.”43 Of course, notions of “natural law” were integral to political
ideologies espoused by Enlightenment thinkers. For Sharp, the right to not live in
perpetual bondage fell into the category of “natural law.” If Enlightenment ideals offered
a modern conceptual framework for Sharp’s antislavery ideology, then Christianity
supplied a more ancient repository of ethical currency. “That such Barbarity should be
suffered in Christian nations,” was, according to Sharp, “a serious concern.”44 Like
Benezet, Sharp was a firm believer in Christianity’s epistemological veracity and moral
unassailability. As such, Sharp’s idea of a moral political system, the type towards which
England needed to strive, was rooted in timeless religious duties.
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At a deeper, structural level, Sharp’s ideas on private property struck to the heart
of transatlantic identity fragmentation. In his 1769 essay, Sharp argued that “every claim
of Property is absolutely unjust in itself, and must necessarily be set aside through the
mercy of the Law, if it interferes, or is inconsistent with that natural and equitable claim
to personal security, which the law of the kingdom hath always favoured.”45 While
Sharp’s glamorized ideas of English legal history were overblown for rhetorical purposes,
the impetus behind them nonetheless indicates a disconnection between traditional
English mores and the political and economic principles upon which the American
colonies were founded. Through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Indians,
slaves, and indentured servants suffered and died under a lack of legal oversight for their
personal security. The very concept of America was predicated on the prerogative of
colonists to seize property and assets that did not belong to them in any “natural” sense.
The colonial definition and application of private property diverged markedly from
English ideas on liberty’s permanence and institutionalization. These divergences were
heightened in England’s public consciousness over the course of the eighteenth century
as transatlantic tension escalated into conflict, and as the issue of slavery took on new
layers of meaning.
Granville Sharp’s righteous crusade reached its climax in 1772 when Lord
Mansfield, Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench, handed down a legal ruling on a
case that involved a runaway slave named James Somersett. The historian Jerome
Nadelhaft describes how the English public misunderstood Lord Mansfield’s court ruling.
“In reality,” says Nadelhaft, “Mansfield had only ruled that ‘a slave could not be shipped
45
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from England against his wills.’”46 This reality was not apprehended by the “great many
Englishmen” who “mistakenly believed that Lord Mansfield had with one sweeping
judicial blow destroyed the institution of slavery in England.”47 To understand how this
public confusion features in the development of an English antislavery identity, it will be
helpful to quote Nadelhaft at length:
The Somersett decision was misunderstood in 1772 because newspaper printers,
readers, and almost everyone involved in the case had for five months been
conditioned to think in a narrow and rigid pattern. The Somersett case had been
hailed as “the great Negro Case,” the case which would end only when the Chief
Justice had ruled on slavery’s legality. The case had been built up as one
involving a central issue – slavery or freedom for all England’s slaves, not simply
for one – which could not be dodged by legal subtleties.48
The English public’s bestowal of gravitas onto the Somersett Case is an interesting
phenomenon. How can we explain a widespread desire for a full-scale referendum on
slavery in England? Why did the English conceive of this legal ruling as “the great Negro
case,” even as the national slave trade thrived?
The clamor that arose around the Somersett Case shows not only the existence of
a latent antislavery ethos in the English discourse, but a common desire to reaffirm
national identity as singular in moral quality. Indeed, the winning strategy of the
Somersett lawyers was to say that in England, freedom was “the grand object of the
laws”; that slavery could not exist in England because it was “not a natural relation”;
because it was “incompatible with natural rights of mankind”; and because it was
opposed to Christianity’s “mild and humane precepts.”49 The successful Somersett
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lawyers couched their argument in terms of an English identity supreme in moral
rectitude, steadfast in religious benevolence, and avant-garde in its adherence to “natural
laws.”
In 1773, a year after the Somersett Case, Granville Sharp published, An essay on
slavery: proving from Scripture its inconsistency with humanity and religion. In addition
to its professed subject, this essay lent further expression to an identity dichotomy that
juxtaposed respectable English churchgoers with unfamiliar colonial slaveholders. In
assembling this narrative, Sharp struggled to reconcile nationalistic prejudices and
matter-of-fact conditions. “That slavery is not consistent with the English constitution,
nor admissible in Great Britain, appears evident” from the Somersett Case’s “solemn
determination,” said Sharp.50 This was despite the already mentioned fact that Lord
Mansfield ruled on neither the legality of slaveholding in England nor the legality of the
English slave trade. Regardless, soon thereafter, Sharp suggested the symbiosis of
religious and national virtue, noting that slavery was unacceptable in England because
Christianity was “a part of the law” in his country.51 This passage, while plainly selfvalidating, also implied that England’s centralized and steadfast Anglicanism was a
hallmark of English identity, effectually drawing a tacit distinction with America’s
unincorporated assortment of Protestant denominations.
In this essay Sharp also conveyed a sense of distantness between England and the
institution of slavery. He expressed dismay that “the descendants of Britain,” did not seek
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redress for the sin of slavery.52 It appears that Sharp’s description of colonial inhabitants
as “descendants” of Britain is not without insinuation. His phrasing connotes a peculiar
aloofness, as if the Crown had forcibly removed its lesser subjects to the other side of the
Atlantic at some point in the remote past. This sentiment is further developed when Sharp
denies England’s agency in slavery’s initial establishment. He attributed its persistence to
“a kind of side-wind,” and claimed that it was a “barbarous custom… originated by
foreigners.”53 At an intellectual level, Sharp probably understood that England was
morally reproachable for slavery. Perhaps to counteract this implicit cognizance, he
ascribed slavery’s origins to vaguely defined, non-English groups. Sharp did not
elaborate on who these foreigners were, but he didn’t need to. His implication – that
slavery was concocted by non-British people – was acutely felt.
Sharp then quoted a colonial lawyer and future American revolutionary, James
Otis, who thought of slavery’s origins in similar terms, saying that it “threatens one day
to reduce both Europe and America to the ignorance and barbarity of the darkest ages.”54
Of course, British notions of “barbarism” were largely synonymous with images of nonwhite populations, as in diametric opposition to the purported Anglo-Saxon ideal. Otis’s
implication was that if slavery degraded the standards of European morality, then this
degradation was a reversal of the civilizing process, and Europeans would begin to
resemble the foreigners who instituted human bondage in the first place. The vague
terminology employed by Sharp and Otis was, firstly, indicative of a shared desire for a
national and ethnic identity that bore little to no responsibility for slavery’s origins.
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Secondly, we must bear in mind that Sharp was writing with an aim in mind, namely, the
cultivation of antislavery sentiment in England. To realize this goal, he seems to have
perceived the necessity of at least partially absolving national sins by labeling nonEnglish people as the architects of slavery’s evils.
A vocal advocate against Granville Sharp and the Somersett ruling was Edward
Long, a British colonial administrator and historian. In 1772, Long published a widely
read essay, Candid Reflections, which attempted to refute Lord Mansfield’s ruling and
halt any momentum in antislavery opinion. One of Long’s central points was that the
vaunted institutionalization of English liberty in fact authorized slavery. Long prefaced
this argument by describing slavery as an offshoot of traditional socioeconomic
hierarchies in England: “On the decline of villenage within the realm, a species of it
sprang up in the remoter parts of the English dominion, the American Plantations.”55
Long’s corroboration for this claim was that villenage “was not abolished by any positive
statue” but instead “grew into desuetude by the gradual extension of our national
commerce.”56 In this mode of thought, conditions of slavery were not anathema to the
English spirit – they simply grew unnecessary as conditions changed over time. Besides,
according to Long, English legal precedents posed no obstacles either: “That neither
Magna Charta, nor the statutes of confirmation [in the subsequent centuries], impeached
the power which a master exercised, of imprisoning the Villein; but, on the contrary, that
other statutes were passed contemporary with the latter, to aid and enforce his power.”57
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The Magna Carta, often perceived by Englishmen as the bedrock of liberty, held no sway
over the contemporary debate on slavery, according to Long. England’s legal history
sanctioned the dominion of landlords over laborers, and slavery did not deserve any
special attention on the matter.
Long’s argument that slavery was not opposed to English identity rejected the
ideological basis of Somersett’s defense lawyers, of whom Granville Sharp was chief
counsel. Noticeably, Long’s rebuttal essay mostly consisted of historical digressions and
legal explications. Unlike Sharp, Long avoided distinctions between colonial identity and
English identity in the context of slavery. Contrariwise, he asserted that slavery was
“agreeable to the national sense,”58 which for Long consisted in the optimization of
imperial economic productivity. Through this commercial lens, slavery was not only
acceptable, but integral to England’s power and prestige. Long offered a vision of Empire
markedly at odds with the ideas of antislavery men like Benezet and Sharp. The conflict
between these viewpoints was rooted in diverging conceptions of imperial identity:
Should the Empire prioritize commercial growth at all costs? Or should it focus on
disseminating and embodying national and religious principles? With the onset of the
American Revolution, these competing conceptions of national and imperial identity
would receive a new impetus and take on new meanings.
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V) Consequences of the American Revolution
At a surface level, the American Revolution appears to have spurred antislavery
sentiment in England and stunted it in America. Slavery in America persisted until the
middle of the nineteenth century, while in England, a public campaign for abolitionism
took off in the late 1780s, culminating in the landmark 1807 Abolition Law. During the
tumultuous years of the Revolutionary War, however, antislavery sentiment was largely
absent in the British Isles. As Brown puts it, “an antislavery movement failed to develop
in Britain during the American Revolution.”59
In revolutionary America, meanwhile, ideological fervor and political
reorganization led to unprecedented antislavery measures: “From Philadelphia to Boston,
between 1767 and 1775, there issued a parade of antislavery resolutions, petitions,
sermons, pamphlets, and legislation aimed principally at halting the slave trade to the
American colonies.”60 During these years of warfare, uncertainty, and unrest, there
developed in America the “moral and ethical injunctions” against slavery that would
remain “a factor in American politics and culture.”61 While the interconnectedness of
imperial oppression and colonial slavery entered the consciousness of many American
revolutionaries, “the vast majority of the texts” written by Englishmen during this period
did, “not refer to colonial slavery or the Atlantic slave trade.”62 Because of this
discrepancy, Brown encourages us to perceive the sustained rise of England’s antislavery
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movement in the 1780s as “a late-born sibling in the family of Anglo-American
antislavery campaigns.”63
While Brown is right to suggest the American Revolution enabled English
antislavery advocacy, I argue we must conceive of the Revolution within the long-term
development of an English antislavery identity that conceived of English citizens and
colonists as fundamentally different. With this point in mind, it seems unsurprising that
English essayists during the Revolution tacitly propagated an identity narrative in which
slavery was, “a peculiarly American vice.”64 After all, America’s institutionalization of
slavery had been invoked by Englishmen for decades to differentiate colonial identity
from English identity.
From a simple hierarchical perspective, it is apparent why the American
Revolution was so acutely damning on England’s supposed moral superiority. The
immorality attributed to colonial slaveholders by English essayists was a less convincing
strain of logic if, as colonists claimed, the English were themselves despots. In short,
revolutionary fervor shined a light on the moral character of transatlantic institutions in
the English-speaking world; slavery’s blatant injustices rendered further institutional
scrutiny unavoidable.
When the American Revolution began in 1775, many prominent Englishmen
argued against the case for American independence. In these treatises, the institution of
colonial slavery was occasionally invoked. It was a reliable point of reference for
Englishmen to decry the hypocrisy of revolutionaries who purported to cherish liberty
and freedom for all men. When slavery was mentioned, the familiar us-versus-them
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narrative resurfaced. Of course, prior to the American Revolution, no strategic
imperatives demanded the formation of any identity dichotomy. Rather, an English
antislavery identity had been primarily of theoretical concern, without practical
exigencies calling it into service. With the onset of revolt, however, the conceptual
schema and definitional terms of an English antislavery identity groomed in the
preceding years were now available for practical use.
In his 1775 essay, A Calm Address to our American Colonies, the esteemed
Anglican minister and theologian John Wesley took issue with colonists who referred to
themselves as slaves of the Crown. “Yea, nine in ten throughout England, have no
representative, have no vote,” said Wesley. “Yet they are no slaves: they enjoy both Civil
and Religious liberty.”65 Wesley’s qualification of slavery amplified his subsequent
point: “Who then is a Slave,” the theologian asked. “Look into America, and you may
easily see. See that Negro, fainting under the load, bleeding under the lash! He is a
slave.”66 By contrasting the justness of imperial government with colonial slavery’s harsh
realities, Wesley portrayed the revolting colonists as unprincipled and hypocritical.
Continuing this line of argument, Wesley appealed to the idea of two diverging moral
viewpoints, effectively attributing blameworthiness to the colonists: “But wherein then
consists the difference between Liberty and Slavery? Herein. You and I, and the English
in general, go where we will, and enjoy the fruit of our labors: This is liberty. The negro
does not: this is slavery.”67 Wesley’s rapidly constructed binary between English liberty
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and American slavery implied a fundamental cultural rupture between English citizens
and colonial subjects. Furthermore, Wesley’s distinction between free men and enslaved
men parallels his implicit distinction between England and America; between the land of
liberty and the land of slavery. In his rejection of American independence, Wesley
condemned the moral character of colonists with a broad sweep of the brush, assigning
shared liability to all colonists for upholding the institution of slavery.
We see a similar portrayal of colonial immorality in Josiah Tucker’s 1775 tract, A
Letter to Edmund Burke. Tucker was a prominent churchman, economist, and political
writer who perceived in slavery a wicked institution unbefitting of England’s national
character. He claimed to be “…thoroughly convinced, that the Laws of Commerce, when
rightly understood, do perfectly coincide with the laws of Morality,” and that slavery was
“…on a fair Calculation, to be the most onerous and expensive Mode of cultivating Land,
and of raising Produce, that could be devised.”68 Tucker’s moral relativism seems
glaringly obvious in hindsight. That he neglected to consider whether or not England’s
extensive slave trading operations adhered to “the laws of Commerce” or “the laws of
Morality” is indicative of the patriotic bias that directed his line of thought when
confronted by the issue of slavery. This prejudice prodded him into declaring that history
had already demonstrated that, “all Masters of Slaves, who are not Slaves themselves,
were, and are, in every Part of the World, possessed with the Haughtiness of Domination
respecting others, and with an invincible Spirit of Freedom regarding themselves.”69
Tucker then expanded this argument, noting that American slaveholders were
68
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predisposed to be “turbulent and factious in respect to the Public, incessantly endeavoring
to pull down and lay low every Order and Degree of Men above themselves.”70 Thus, for
Tucker, slavery not only denigrated the moral standing of American colonists. It also
engendered a subversive mindset that threatened political stability and effectively
invalidated colonial protests.
In 1778, a prominent figure named William Pulteney expressed similar
viewpoints. The wealthy politician decried the hypocrisy of slaveholding colonists and
portrayed the colonists as conscienceless beasts. Pulteney described a horror-show in
which slaveholders devised “…the most unjust and severe torments that ingenious cruelty
can invent, or unrelenting tyranny can practice.”71 With this line of argument, Pulteney
gave expression to an inveterate streak of cruelty among colonists that manifested itself
in the institution of slavery. He developed this theme further, describing how colonial
slaves were, “...subjected to the caprice of an imperious tyrant, who has unjustly deprived
him of liberty, deliberately rendered his existence miserable, and by virtue of his
iniquitous and hellish bargain, pretends he has a right to dispose even of life itself.”72
While there is plenty of truth in these condemnations, what’s important for our purposes
is Pulteney’s inclination to attack colonial slavery and exonerate England. Indeed, the foil
to his vitriolic condemnations is the lack of attention paid to England’s prosperous slave
trading industry.
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Even if prominent English writers castigated slavery, their rebukes were largely
ad hoc measures. For most supposed opponents of slavery, “…helping enslaved Africans
often mattered far less…than more proximate and sometimes very different goals.”73
Hence, the issue slavery acquired greater relevance in the charged ideological landscape
of the American Revolution. In the transatlantic debate around the meaning of liberty and
purpose of government, slavery appeared incongruent with not only purported
Revolutionary ideals, but the entire Enlightenment mode of thought that informed
England’s conception of how liberty ought to be institutionalized. Luckily for the English
writers who argued against the American Revolution, slavery (as opposed to the slave
trade) was widespread in America and absent in England. This straightforward
discrepancy led to reflexive invocations of colonial slavery within the fabric of their
broader pro-English arguments.
In his book Runaway America, David Waldstreicher helpfully identifies three
predominant schemas whereby the English conceived of American colonists prior to and
during the Revolutionary War. The first was, “the most traditional,” where the English
“viewed Americans as fellow nationals.” The second, “…cast the Americans as
foreigners who were, nevertheless, part of the empire.” The third perspective, “…placed
the Americans beyond the English nation but still part of the expanded British
community.”74 While these viewpoints might be valid at a general level, I endeavor to say
that none of them accurately describe the English perception of colonial identity when
colonial identity was conceived vis-à-vis slavery. To be sure, the prism of slavery was not
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a priori invoked when English people contemplated the culture and identity of American
colonists. However, when slavery was brought into the identity equation, then
perceptions of colonial identity shifted in a negative direction. Naturally, the moral tenets
and philosophical ideals of the American Revolution heightened the necessity for such a
cultural distinction. In colonial slavery, the English perceived an institution that annulled
the colonists’ supposed prioritizations of universal liberty. In advancing this argument,
Englishmen drew from the conceptual terms of differentiation that had permeated the
transatlantic identity discourse for decades.
When analyzing appeals to slavery by anti-Revolutionary English writers, we
must also bear in mind the contemporaneous antislavery activity in America. As I have
already mentioned, the Revolutionary War inadvertently produced the ideological
bedrock for American abolitionism in the nineteenth century. Moreover, the birth of this
intellectual framework was accompanied by concrete action. In 1774 and 1776,
America’s newly formed Continental Congress instituted “vigorously enforced resolves
[that] brought the slave trade to a standstill until the end of the Revolutionary War.”75
Hence, for many American patriots, revolutionary activity reconfigured traditional
conceptions of social and economic systems. In their boycott of the slave trade, American
revolutionaries sought to “justify the struggle for political liberty, to sanctify their
rejection of imperial authority, to render the Revolutionary movement worthy of
esteem.”76 Of course, abolitionist stirrings in Revolutionary America would not amount
to concrete action for many years to come. Even so, antislavery sentiment and abolitionist
organization were, during the Revolutionary War, more prevalent in America than in
75
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Great Britain. Therefore, from 1775 to 1783, American colonists were patently more
active in advancing liberty than their British peers, both in terms of liberty as a general
principle, and liberty in its relation to slavery and the slave trade. Liberty, of course, was
conceived by Englishmen as the hallmark of just governance. Moreover, in terms of
political organization, liberty was thought to be embodied in England’s harmonious
arrangement of Monarchical authority tempered by Parliamentary representation.
In light of this discrepancy, it seems fitting that abolitionism took off in England
after the Revolutionary War. Was the ascent of antislavery sentiment in the English
consciousness something of a collective knee-jerk reaction to their American counterparts
outperforming them in the fight to uphold that vaunted, quintessentially English, idea of
liberty? Brown hints at such a conclusion, saying: “By the early 1780s, some in Britain
had begun to select new criteria when evaluating overseas enterprise. The moral character
of imperial authority, the ethics of British conduct outside the British isles, started to
figure in the public discussions of empire with increasing frequency”; there emerged
“…new ideas that aimed to bring imperial practices in line with older assumptions about
the British commitment to liberty.”77 Thus, the American Revolution profoundly
influenced English ideas of how liberty ought to figure in the management of a global
empire. New conceptions of English identity would need to reevaluate the moral
character of imperial institutions.
It is worthwhile to consider the American Revolution alongside the theoretical
work of Norbert Elias, an Annales historian who sought to explain the “civilizing
process” of Europe, whereby “…the relatively spontaneous behavior of medieval man is
77
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gradually displaced by the socially disciplined and emotionally constrained behavior of
his modern counterpart.” In this process of constraint, according to Elias, “The threshold
of shame measures tolerable social behavior in a given historical era.” “By charting the
changes in the threshold of shame from one era to the next, the emerging contours of the
structure of the personality of Western man are defined.”78 If one wishes to understand an
English antislavery identity as consequent upon the American Revolution, then Elias’s
“threshold of shame” does wonders in accounting for the psychological underpinnings of
England’s widespread antislavery sentiment in the 1780s. Perhaps, the Revolutionary
War – insofar as it demonstrated the rectitude of colonists and challenged England’s
commitment to liberty – served as an impetus that allowed for a “threshold of shame” to
be crossed in the English consciousness. As will be shown presently, the ideological
climate of the 1780s compounded this sense of shame, amplified the antislavery
sensibility, and paved the way for a sustained abolitionist campaign.
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VI) The Crystallization of an Antislavery Identity
“By the end of 1787,” says James Walvin, a historian on slavery, “the abolitionist
campaign had become genuinely popular: nationwide, it cut across boundaries of class
and region – and gender.”79 Brown corroborates this account, saying: “The breadth of
public support in those first heady months had few precedents in the late eighteenthcentury British political history.”80 This was no small feat, considering the scarcity of
antislavery sentiment not long beforehand. The American Revolution widened England’s
national discourse around issues like the purpose of empire, the meaning of liberty, and
the nature of tyranny. Walvin notes, “…America loomed large in British life. Politics
were overshadowed by the British disasters and defeat in North America.”81 Slavery’s
relationship to the War was unavoidable, and in light of the colonists’ boycott of the
English slave trade, imperially sanctioned human bondage came to the forefront of the
English conscience like never before.
Even with the American Revolution’s pivotal influence over English perceptions
of slavery, events in the colonies did not lead inexorably to 1787, when The Society for
Effecting the Abolition of the Slave Trade was founded and the English antislavery
movement kicked off in earnest. When the Majesty’s troops were effectively defeated at
the Siege of Yorktown in October of 1781, there was no indication that slavery would
persist in the post-war national conversation. However, with the Revolution’s emphases
on liberty and justice, the English public had, perhaps unwittingly, adopted a more
objective mindset in their evaluation of imperial conduct. The revolt of the colonies
79
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primed the English to be more cognizant of injustices committed on their behalf. This
cognizance was evident in the March of 1783, when a series of horrific events on the high
seas entered England’s public discussion.
What’s now known as the the Zong massacre occurred in November of 1781,
nearly a year and a half before headlines were made in the English press. The Zong was a
slave trading ship that belonged to a slave-trading syndicate based out of Liverpool and
owned by a wealthy merchant named William Gregson. While transporting captured
Africans across the Atlantic, a series of navigational mistakes jeopardized the feasibility
of the Zong berthing in Black River, Jamaica, its intended port. With supplies running
low, the Zong’s crew opted to jettison over one hundred Africans, throwing them
overboard to drown. The crew’s decision appears to have been financially motivated.
Like most slave-trading companies, the Gregson syndicate had taken out insurance on the
lives of their future slaves, since Africans were categorized as “cargo.” If they died
onshore, or of “natural causes” while being transported, the insurers would provide no
monetary recompense. However, if the Zong’s crew could demonstrate that their decision
to jettison “cargo” was done in order to save the lives of other soon-to-be slaves, then the
insurers were liable to pay Gregson’s company. Legal proceedings began in March of
1783 when insurers refused any form of remuneration.82
The Zong Massacre might have escaped public attention were it not for Olaudah
Equiano, a free black man living in London who informed Granville Sharp about the
case. Naturally, Sharp would not allow such a patent atrocity to slide. The aging
abolitionist, “dispatched angry missives left and right – long, furious letters – to any
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individual or organization he thought might help” – in short, Sharp “employed every
means in his power to give the utmost publicity to the circumstances that had
happened.”83 Thanks to the efforts of Equiano and Sharp, the facts of the Zong case
entered England’s national discussion. More than just that, “…the grisly details about the
slave trade seeped from the courtroom into the wider public sphere.”84 Indeed, “the story
of the Zong went from being an utterly exceptional story to becoming the very model for
the slave trade itself.”85 Of course, the timing of the Zong case is critical. Over the course
of the eighteenth century, innumerable Africans died while crossing the Atlantic Ocean in
English slave ships. In theory, there was nothing new about Englishmen killing Africans.
For Walvin, “…what gave the Zong story its significance was its immediacy.”86
“In essence… the Zong case was a very British event… The ship, the men, the courts, the
law officers, even the law itself, were all local, not exotic or foreign.”87 This feeling of
locality was vital in promoting the English public’s increased awareness of the slave
trade’s horrors. However, that the Zong case transpired in English courts cannot alone
account for its role in the development of an English antislavery identity. Rather, the
Zong incident is better understood as an event that occurred in the wake of the American
Revolution, when the British Empire was being reconfigured on a global scale, and when
moral obligations had attained a newfound, as Walvin would say, “immediacy.” If
American independence implied that England had systematically exercised unjust
political power, then the Zong ordeal served as visceral proof of inhumane actions
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perpetrated by Englishmen. It was no longer disputable that brutal illiberality could in
fact transpire under the tutelage of nation perceived as inherently good.
Norbert Elias’s concept of a “threshold of shame” is again relevant in
consideration of the Zong massacre. This threshold – which aptly encapsulated England’s
evolving attitude toward Empire in the 1780s – would have only widened further at the
behest of the Zong. “The tendency to dwell on the moral character of the empire,” notes
Brown, “would be a lasting consequence of the American war.”88 Indeed, it was this very
mentality that sparked public awareness of injustices perpetrated in India. In the years
after the American Revolution, “the treatment of native populations on the subcontinent
became the subject of sustained official questioning.”89 Heightened worries over the
treatment of Indian subjects emanated from the same instinct that was propelling
antislavery sentiment forward. Traditional images of Africans and Indians, while
different in specifics, shared the same lens of national superiority that justified suspect
imperial ventures. Indeed, it was this basic attitude that allowed the English to conceive
of slavery as “a peculiarly American vice,”90 which carried the dual implication of
English rectitude and colonial sin. If the American Revolution casted doubts on
England’s national rectitude, then the Zong massacre corroborated these concerns, in
effect underscoring the need to exemplify political righteousness and reformulate
imperial ideology.
The desire for such a reformulation is evident in a widely read 1784 essay,
entitled, An essay on the treatment and conversion of African slaves in the British Sugar
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Colonies. The author, James Ramsay, was a former ship’s surgeon and Anglican priest
who had traveled through the West and witnessed slavery’s cruelty on a firsthand basis.
In this essay, published a year after the Zong massacre, Ramsay exhorted his countrymen
to renounce the slave trade: “But when the English, a nation most highly favoured of
liberty, is viewed as taking the lead in this odious traffic… freedom must blush
indignantly, while humanity mourns over the reproachful tale.”91 In bemoaning the
incongruence of English liberty with the English slave trade, Ramsay drew a connection
between English liberty and other lofty philosophical ideals, like “freedom” and
“humanity.” From the beginning, Ramsay left no room for doubt about this essay’s
underlying aim: “humanity… not reputation.”92 The Anglican priest perceived his moral
duty – and by extension, his national duty – as one of atonement, with his ethical vision
working to ameliorate imperial sins. By and large he was successful. As Walvin notes,
Ramsay’s 1784 essay was “an important abolitionist tract” in the years to follow.93
However, the substance of Ramsay’s argument requires further qualification.
Even though he advocated for the abolition of the English slave trade, Ramsay’s 1784
essay did not advance unabashed emancipationist viewpoints. Rather, the clergyman’s
primary aim was to improve conditions for enslaved Africans, rather than fundamentally
restructure racial relations in the West Indies. “What here is claimed for them [slaves]?”
Ramsay rhetorically asked at the beginning of his essay. “Not bounties, or gifts from
parliament, or people; but leave to become more useful to themselves, their masters, and
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the state.”94 Proselytization was Ramsay’s envisioned method to improve the living
conditions for slaves in the West Indies. According to the Anglican priest, any given
slaveholder was “bound to extend his care to the security of their [slaves] eternal
happiness, by instructing them in the relation which they bear to the great Author of their
being, and gracious Redeemer of their souls.”95 Thus, Ramsay’s previous comments on
“freedom” and “humanity” were of a specific sort, namely, a Christianized form of
bondage, wherein freedom would be attained in the afterlife, and humanity realized in the
non-human sphere. In articulating this argument, Ramsay compared French-owned slaves
(who were successfully converted to Christianity) with heathen English slaves. “The
French slave,” claimed Ramsay, “is placed above the solicitations of hunger; and
respecting his behavior, has, to the dread of pain, superadded, as a guide, the hopes and
fears of religion, and the approbation and displeasure of his priest.”96 Thus, for Ramsay,
the introduction of Christianity not only improved the temporal and spiritual welfare of
slaves. It also, conveniently, created docility. In Ramsay’s calculations, we see the same
strain of logic that informed the methodology of the SPG. The moral calculus of imperial
conduct was deeply imbued by the missionary impulse, perhaps because proselytization
was practically unimpeachable in its noble intent. Furthermore, we once again see how
the Christianization of slaves functioned as a compromise between unequivocal
abolitionism and proslavery mentalities.
Even if Ramsay failed to proffer arguments for full abolitionism, he nonetheless
intimated egalitarian sentiments that stood out against traditional ideas of ethnic
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superiority. He dedicated an entire chapter to disproving claims of racial superiority,
entitled, Natural Capacity of African Slaves Vindicated. In this section, Ramsay said that,
“…every possible collateral evidence of history, tradition, national manners, and
customs, assures us that men had one common ancestor.”97 Ramsay’s assiduous denial of
Anglo-Saxon superiority appeared at odds with some of his other suggestions,
particularly his tacit support for slavery if Christianity were spread amongst slave
populations. After all, if humans were fundamentally equal, how could human bondage
justly persist, regardless of religious factors?
In addressing this question, we must consider two possible situations. First,
Ramsay’s tone suggests that he was not disinclined toward pragmatism. He therefore
recognized the futility of any radical propositions. Second, celestial equality did not
necessarily translate to temporal equality. Men could – and still can – recognize the
inherent alikeness of all human beings while simultaneously disavowing the imperative
to systematically institute conditions of justice and equality. As Hutton says, for the
composition of a Histoire des Mentalités, “The task is to establish the mental horizons of
an age – not only as these open upon the future, but also as they delimit the possibilities
of thought in a given historical era.”98 Perhaps then, in the world of the eighteenth
century, the institutionalization of full equality between different racial groups was not
only an untenable proposition, but an unconceivable idea.
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Concluding Thoughts
Regardless of structural limitations on abolitionism’s scope, antislavery sentiment
attained new heights in the years after the Revolutionary War. In 1787, an assortment of
English men and women, many prominent Evangelicals already involved in social
reformation movements, formed the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade. Their
aims were straightforward: convince the English public of slavery’s horrors, and cajole
Parliament into abolishing the slave trade. Only a year later, lawmakers passed the Slave
Trade Act of 1788, which limited the number of slaves that could be transported on one
slave trading vessel. This law was renewed and extended in the 1790s, but the Society for
the Abolition of the Slave Trade continued fighting for total abolition of England’s slave
trading industry. With the continual growth of public support and William Wilberforce’s
stalwart presence in Parliament, the Society’s efforts succeeded with the 1807 Act for the
Abolition of the Slave Trade, the first real step in the demise of European slavery in the
Americas.
This thesis’s task has been to chart the mental horizons of antislavery’s growth in
the English speaking world through the eighteenth century. My aim was to render a
descriptive account of abolitionist sentiment, rather than establish definitive causal bases.
I have sought a taxonomical survey of conceptual schema and institutional mechanisms
that mediated and redefined ideas of English identity in their relation to slavery.
Admittedly, the instinct that initially led me to examine identity now leads me to think
that the process of identity reformulation in fact constitutes a fundamental area of
causality in the structural trajectory of human society.
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In light of Longue Durée’s pertinence, we should recognize that antislavery
sentiment is, in a sense, timeless. Countless colonists and travelers expressed horror over
slavery, from the time it was first instituted in the New World. Slavery’s visceral cruelty
was experienced by observers at an instinctual level. The raw element of the human
psyche frowns upon human bondage, for no other species in the animal kingdom
systematically subjugates its fellow brothers and sisters. Slavery as such is the
institutional embodiment of humankind’s growing pains; the sheer primal lurch towards
power and self-interest coming into conflict with ethical imperatives that, relatively
speaking, were constructed at an astounding rate. Only some 11,000 years separated the
advent of sedentary agrarian communities from modern Europe’s rejection of slavery.
Such a timespan appears minuscule in comparison to the millions of years during which
earthly organisms evolved, always directed by a will to survive, which seemingly
transmogrified into a will to power with the development of organized society.
Once again, an Annales historian can help unmask the complex structural
underpinnings of man’s mental universe. Lucien Febvre, cofounder of the Annales
School, suggested “…there is an “historical curve” in collective psychology, extending
from primitive society, in which emotional life (organized through myth and ritual)
stands at the center of culture, toward modern society, in which intellectual activity
crowds emotional life toward the periphery.”99 Assuming that “intellectual activity”
pertains to the organizational improvement of material conditions, then transatlantic
slavery – in its rationalization and dehumanization of economic production – represents
the ethical nadir of Western society’s advancement into modernity. Conversely, we might
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understand the immutability of antislavery sentiment as Febvre’s “emotional life”
reasserting itself into the economic realm of human activity, which has increasingly
monopolized the social life of human society as human society has grown more
technologically advanced.
The evolution of an English antislavery identity depended on many political,
economic, and social developments that had no direct bearing on slavery. This, I believe,
is the value of my methodological approach. That is, through the prism of identity, one
attains a clearer understanding of how English society’s structural underpinnings
functioned and evolved, at the institutional and ideological level. Understanding this
interplay is critical, since the development of an English antislavery identity was
engendered through the interdependency of institutional action and ideological
propagation. Norbert Elias perceived this process as the mutually constitutive relationship
between psychological conditions and social realities. According to Hutton, “He [Elias]
argues that man is a creator of forms, and that these forms lend structure to his feelings as
well as to his social relationships. Such forms constitute a grid which meshes all of his
psychological and social relationships. Psychological and social processes thus mirror
one another, and interpretations of them are interchangeable.”100 In the case of an English
antislavery identity, Elias’s “forms” were the guiding ideological principles of English
discourse, which took on new meaning as structural conditions realigned. Liberty,
empire, governance, monarchy, race, God, and economy were just a few of the “forms”
that framed perceptions of national identity, and thus seeped into the Englishman’s
understanding of himself and colonial slavery.
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The conceptual terms that underlay the missionary impulse translated into
organizational action, in the form of the SPG and other proselytizing bodies. With the
Georgia Colony in the 1730s and Quaker antislavery movement of the 1750s and 1760s,
religious obligations and moral principles directly affected organizational actions. In the
case of Anthony Benezet, Granville Sharp, and other antislavery thinkers, the propagation
of philosophical paradigms provided a conceptual foundation for the legalization of
positive change, as shown in the Somersett Case. And of course, the American
Revolution upended and redefined the ideological landscape that constituted a common
understanding of what it meant to be English. This momentous upheaval energized
antislavery sentiment, paving the way for the gradual adoption of a new English identity
that not only prided itself on antislavery advocacy, but which recognized the growing
need for political and ethical oversight of transnational imperial affairs.
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